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RECOMMENDED MEASURES
UNDER THE ANTARCTIC TREATY:
HARDENING COMPLIANCE WITH
SOFT INTERNATIONAL LAW
Christopher C. Joyner*
INTRODUCTION
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty1 provides for certain recommended
measures to be adopted and approved as policies by the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Party (ATCP) states governing the regime.2 These meas-
ures are adopted at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party Meetings
(ATCMs) that convene annually and form non-binding instruments, or
"soft" law within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). 3 By 1998, ATCMs
* Professor of International Law, Department of Government, Georgetown University;
Ph.D. University of Virginia (1977); M.A. Florida State University (1973); M.A. Florida State
University (International Relations 1972); B.A. Florida State University (1970). This article is
an expanded version of a study originally commissioned by the American Society of Interna-
tional Law as part of its Project on Compliance with International Soft Law (1996-98). The
author would like to acknowledge his gratitude to Donald R. Rothwell of the Law Faculty at the
University of Sydney for his comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. The research assis-
tance of Ms. Tamara Cofman Wittes in preparing the appendices is also greatly appreciated. All
errors of commission or omission are, of course, the responsibility of the author.
1. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959,12 U.S.T. 794,402 U.N.T.S. 71.
2. The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, which possess decision-making capability
among the Antarctic Treaty parties, presently count twenty-six States as members. The twelve
original parties to the Antarctic Treaty-Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union [Russia], the United Kingdom, and the
United States-comprised the initial group of Consultative Party states. Since the Antarctic
Treaty's entry into force in 1961, Consultative Party status has been conferred on certain States
that have qualified by "demonstrat[ing] its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial sci-
entific research activity" in and around the continent. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX,
para. 2. As of 1998, the following additional States have been admitted to the Consultative Party
group: Brazil, China, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, India, Italy, South Korea, Netherlands, Peru,
Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay. See HANDBOOK OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM
18-19 (John Heap ed., U.S. Dept. of State, 8th ed. 1994) [hereinafter ANTARCTIC TREATY
HANDBOOK]. These ATCPs convene in annual meetings to set recommended policy for the
Antarctic.
There are also certain Contracting States that have ratified the Antarctic Treaty, but have
not sought to become ATCPs. Included among this group of Non-Consultative Parties in
1998 are: Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Republic of Slova-
kia, Denmark, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Papua New Guinea, Romania, Switzerland Turkey, and the Ukraine. See id.
The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), created in 1958 during the
International Geophysical Year, has become the principal advisory body on scientific matters
for the ATCPs.
3. The Antarctic Treaty System consists of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and four other
related instruments: the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora,
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had adopted at least 228 recommendations as a corpus of soft law for
regulating and guiding activities in the Antarctic region.
Even so, since the Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1961, three
fundamental difficulties have complicated the form and substance of
these recommended measures. First, the legal value attached to recom-
mendations remains vague and subject to varied interpretation by
Member States. The degree to which recommended measures are legally
binding on ATCP governments lacks precise clarification. Second, even
granting that recommendations have a legally-binding quality, the
ATCPs have yet to determine: (a) the scope of a recommended meas-
ure's binding quality, i.e. which parties are bound by ATCM
recommendations and whether it is only the ATCPS, all parties to the
Antarctic Treaty, including Non-Consultative parties, or are private par-
ties and third-party governments included; and (b) the degree of a
recommended measure's binding quality. That is, whether recommen-
dations are merely soft law, whether they have risen to the level of hard
law, or whether they qualify as something in between. Finally, the Ant-
arctic Treaty regime lacks a uniform manner in which ATCPs approve,
integrate, and enforce the recommendations as binding regulations on
Antarctic activities within the domestic legal systems of their govern-
ments.
These considerations point to the chief purpose of this article,
namely to ascertain whether recommended measures are merely
exhortations approved by an international group of States-thereby
generating only limited, voluntary effects-or whether they constitute
something more-instruments with a genuine obligatory character,
which create legally binding rights and duties for States. In the latter
June 2-13, 1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, modified in Modification of the Agreed Measures Adopted
Under Recommendation 111-8 for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, Nov. 29,
1968, 24 U.S.T. 1802 [hereinafter the Agreed Measures], reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 2048; the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals,
signed by the United States June 28, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, 1080 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into
force March 11, 1978), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 156;
the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, adopted on May
20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 178
(entered into force April 7, 1982); and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Ant-
arctic Treaty, Xlth Special Consultative Meeting in Madrid, adopted on October 4, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1455 [hereinafter Madrid Environmental Protection Protocol], reprinted in ANT-
ARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 2018. The Protocol entered into force on
January 14, 1998, having been ratified by all twenty-six Consultative Parties for it to enter
into force. An Antarctic minerals treaty, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Min-
erals Resource Activities, done June 2, 1988, 30 I.L.M. 190, reprinted in ANTARCTIC
TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 203, was negotiated in 1988, but has been shelved
given the purposes and principles in the Madrid Protocol. Similarly, provisions in the Agreed
Measures were consolidated and are now superseded by the Protocol since it has entered into
force.
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case, compliance is considered to determine the legal reach and
relevance ATCM recommendations have for state policy. This article,
therefore, examines the process by which ATCM recommended
measures are created, the status of these instruments under international
law, and the implementation record by Antarctic Treaty governments for
these instruments since 1961.
CREATING ATCM RECOMMENDATIONS
The Antarctic Treaty, in Article IX, paragraph 1, asserts that
"Representatives of the Contracting Parties" must meet regularly (in
ATCMs) in order to recommend "measures" to the governments in the
furtherance of the Treaty's principles and objectives.4 Paragraph 4 of
that same article provides that recommended measures shall "become
effective" [if and] when they are approved by the unanimous vote of the
delegates of all ATCPs attending an ATCM.'
The Antarctic Treaty provides that "representatives" have appropri-
ate authority to exchange information and consult one another "on
matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica." In this regard, the
representatives may deliberate, formulate and consider "measures" (read
to mean "policy considerations") that are "in furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Treaty." Representatives then
"recommend" those measures to their governments.6  As the
representatives of sovereign States, these individuals can discuss any
4. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX, para. 1.
5. This rule is not expressed in the Antarctic Treaty, but was established in practice at
the First Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) in 1961, and was subsequently
codified in the Rules of Procedures of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings, reprinted
in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 271-284. See also Roberto E. Guyer,
The Antarctic System, 1973(11) RECUEIL DES COURS DE L' ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL 151, 186. These Rules have been amended twice, in 1983 and 1987. The status of
recommendations was transformed in 1995. See infra text accompanying notes 60-66.
6. As provided for in paragraph 1 of Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, participants at
ATCMs are referred to as "representatives" of the Consultative Parties' Governments. They
are not merely experts or private persons nominated by governments. They not only function
as "representatives" of their government, but also personify their governments' policy posi-
tions. Representatives speak as government agents, negotiate as government officials, and
determine policy based on government instructions. The persons representing ATCP gov-
ernments are duly appointed agents of executive power and authority, whose actions are
carried out in the name of their State. Representatives negotiate, agree upon, adopt and rec-
ommend to their governments the approval of measures in ATCP meeting. The actions of
official representatives are clearly to be attributed to the governments of each ATCP. One
query left unanswered in the Treaty is whether the head of delegation is the only
"representative" for each ATCP, or might each person on a delegation be considered to be a
"representative" in his or her own right?
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matter they wish, although they cannot be compelled to accept or
support any proposed measure unless their government desires to do so.
Since 1961, practice under the Antarctic Treaty System has evolved
into a multi-phase process for producing and adopting these measures.
First, various ATCPs informally discuss a proposal for a recommenda-
tion and negotiate its substance. Once the text has been agreed upon, the
measure is formally submitted to the ATCM. In plenary discussion,
ATCP representatives then agree through consensus to adopt the meas-
ure. ATCP representatives then recommend approval of the adopted
measure to their respective governments. During this third phase, each
government decides through its own municipal processes whether to
accept the measure. The final phase is that of approval, for which a
"recommended" measure will "become effective" for each ATCP gov-
ernment only after it has been approved at the domestic level by all
other ATCP governments.' Each government must then implement the
measure and incorporate it into its own municipal law.
The period between the adoption of a recommended measure at an
ATCM and its subsequent approval by each ATCP government (i.e., the
recommendation phase) allows those governments to prepare for the
measure to be integrated into their domestic law and policy considera-
tions. In this interim, it is reasonable to expect that ATCP governments
would refrain from efforts to defeat the object and purpose of a recom-
mended measure, or from taking actions to dissuade other governments
from approving that particular measure. While such an expectation has
not reached the level of a formal peremptory norm, there is a funda-
mental expectation that all ATCP governments will make appropriate
efforts toward ensuring that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica
contrary to the principles and purposes of the Treaty. Given that ATCP
representatives adopt a recommendation by consensus, the clear impli-
cation is that governments are positively disposed to consider the
7. The test for whether a matter may be considered as a measure under Article IX is
whether it is "in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty." In fact, the Treaty
does not specify what its principles and objectives are, a situation that must be inferred from
the instrument's preamble and provisions. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX.
8. See generally Carlo Focarelli, The Legal Nature of the Acts Adopted under Article IX
of the Antarctic Treaty and Their Implementation in Italy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
ANTARCTICA 505, 505-580 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1996). Measures
approved through this process are presumed to be "in furtherance of the principles and ob-
jectives of the Antarctic Treaty." Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX. This precondition
appeals to whatever binding quality might be attached to recommendation measures and their
contribution as policy actions to develop the Antarctic Treaty System. Greater legal value is
attached to recommendations as binding acts than mere expressions of exhortation. See 1
ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTER-STATE AND NATIONAL
DOCUMENTS, Booklet AT4, at 9, para. 41 (W.M. Bush ed., 1991).
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measure and will not strive to subvert it-an ambition that would con-
travene the approval process and the spirit of the Treaty's purpose that
Antarctica not become the scene or object of international discord.9
On balance, this process of adopting recommended measures as soft
law has worked sufficiently well, as nearly all Antarctic activities have
been directed and supported by governments, and therefore could be
government-regulated. The recommendations benefit those governments
which have serious domestic constitutional or legislative barriers to
adopting a measure as a legally binding obligation. Enabling a govern-
ment's executive branch to accept hortatory (soft law) measures in
substance, and to implement and administer them in practice, alleviates
that government from unnecessarily complicated (and slow) political
encumbrances. This flexibility remains a strength of the Antarctic
Treaty arrangement, so long as governments implement in practice what
they have agreed to accept in principle. '°
The value of recommended measures as regulators of Antarctic ac-
tivities is underscored by the fact that they are adopted only with the
unanimous support of the Consultative Parties attending that meeting."
Approval of measures can be done only by the Consultative Parties,
which excludes from decision-making States which are Contracting
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, but which have not obtained Consultative
Party status.' 2 Likewise excluded from making decisions are observers
and experts from international organizations who might have been in-
9. This inferred duty flows from Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which affirms that States are obligated not to defeat the object or purpose of a treaty
prior to its entry into force until it has "made its intention clear not to become a party to the
treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 336 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
10. More recently, though, resort to hortatory measures has been viewed as a deficiency
in regulating conduct in the Antarctic. This perception arose with increasing numbers of
private parties and commercial tourists coming to Antarctica and prompted consideration in
the early 1990s for drafting a specific, legally-binding annex on the regulation of tourism to
the Environmental Protection Protocol. The ATCPs ultimately deemed such an annex unnec-
essary, however. See Davor Vidas, The Legitimacy of the Antarctic Tourism Regime, in
GOvERNING THE ANTARCTIC: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGrIMACY OF THE ANTARCTIC
TREATY SYSTEM 294, 306-316 (Olav S. Stokke and Davor Vidas eds., 1996).
11. Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure simply asserts: "The recommendations formu-
lated by the Meeting shall be approved by the representatives of all Consultative Parties
present and shall be set forth in the final report." Revised Rules of Procedure of Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Meetings [1987], Rule 24, reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK,
supra note 2, at 275, 277. The final report must be approved by "a majority of the represen-
tatives of Consultative Parties present." Id. Rule 25.
12. Id. Rule 1.
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vited to attend ATCM proceedings." Decisionmaking in ATCMs is not
done by formal votes. Decisions during the proceedings are taken "on
the basis of consensus informally arrived at."'' 4 This is important because
the ATCP representatives can discuss, negotiate, and compromise politi-
cal and national interest concerns about various measures to create an
agreement, thus ensuring that the measures will be adopted, and pre-
cluding diplomatic strains and political friction that might arise from
voting-a process which by its very nature can be divisive.
LAWFUL STATUS OF ATCM RECOMMENDATIONS
Typically "recommendations" in international practice convey only
hortatory meaning. To recommend is to endorse as fit, worthy, or com-
petent, or to advise as being an appropriate option. A recommendation
neither directly nor implicitly assigns legally binding obligations. The
key query thus becomes clear: Are Antarctic Treaty recommendations
merely hortatory assertions, or do they carry legal obligations? Deter-
mination of the legal status of Antarctic Treaty recommendations
requires that paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article IX be interpreted within the
context of the traditional criteria used in international practice and codi-
fied in the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. 5
When measures are adopted at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party
Meetings, these are indeed only recommendations made by the States'
representatives to their governments. The representatives at ATCMs lack
the authority to commit their governments to legally binding obliga-
tions, nor does the language of the Antarctic Treaty expect that. Article
IX bears this out by providing in its paragraph 4 that, "The measures ...
shall become effective when approved by all the Contracting Parties
whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held
to consider those measures.""' All ATCP governments must approve a
recommendation through their domestic decision-making processes be-
fore the recommendation might be considered as binding. But even then,
the legal nature of that recommendation is questionable.
One might infer that the term "shall become effective" means "shall
enter into force." Whether a measure "becomes effective" or "enters into
13. Id. Rule 2. This rule permits attendance by representatives from the Commission for
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and the Scientific Committee on
Antarctic Research (SCAR).
14. SIR ARTHUR WATrS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 29
(1992).
15. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, arts. 31-34.
16. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX. See also WATTS, supra note 14, at 24-32
(discussing the legal effectiveness of recommended measures).
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force," the act in either case would seem to generate certain rights and
duties.'7 That inference, however, is misplaced. The meaning of the
phase to "become effective" is ambiguous and subject to wide interpre-
tation. While "effective" might suggest notions of producing desired
results or actually becoming operative, it should not be considered syn-
onymous with either "to become legally binding" or "to impart legal
obligations." But neither does it exclude that meaning. The obligatory
depth attached to a recommendation's "effectiveness" remains unclear
and subject to interpretation.
The unanimity rules required for adoption strongly suggests that
measures recommended under the Antarctic Treaty are binding. Once
unanimously approved twice, first at the ATCM, then by each ATCP
government through its own domestic procedures, "recommended"
measures enter a new legal status: they are no longer just recommenda-
tions, but are "effective" ones. It seems illogical to argue that an agreed-
upon act, after being subjected to a double approval process by unani-
mous decision of the governments concerned, performed through their
own executive agencies, would not be construed as carrying any
obligatory legal authority.
The approval of measures under Article IX, paragraph 4, invites
consideration of the question for which States these measures "become
effective." Consultative Parties are undoubtedly affected, since each of
them had to approve the measure. The situation for other States is less
clear, however. It seems reasonable that recommendations would obli-
gate non-consultative states party to the Antarctic Treaty when the
measure was adopted, since non-ATCP governments are obligated to
abide by the Treaty provisions. Adopting an approved measure is a
function of the Treaty, producing legal (if only hortatory) effects for all
Treaty parties-even though some of them might be removed from
making that decision.
On the other hand, a number of governments have acceded to the
Antarctic Treaty since 1961, after certain measures have become effec-
tive. Are acceding governments bound to recommended measures that
were adopted prior to their entry into the Antarctic Treaty relationship?
Does the fact that these governments had no voice in adopting measures
preclude those governments from being bound formally to recommen-
dations made effective before their accession? Or should the measures
adopted by the ATCPs be construed as integral parts of the Antarctic
Treaty regime, thus constituting an Antarctic Treaty package deal to
17. See Alberto Colella, The Legal Nature of Antarctic Recommendations and Their Im-
plementation in the Domestic Legal Systems, in 8 COLLANA Di STUDI 203, 207 (Francesco
Francioni ed., 1992).
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which a government accedes in full, with the implicit obligation to ac-
cept adopted recommended measures as Treaty policy? Although no law
definitively resolves the matter, the latter interpretation appears more
compelling in light of state practice.
Certain recommendations explicitly state the legal value of all rec-
ommendations stemming from Article IX of the Treaty. For example,
Recommendation 111-7 (the seventh recommendation of the Third
ATCM) asserts that recommendations approved by the Contracting Par-
ties are "so much a part of the overall structure of cooperation
established by the Treaty" that any new Consultative Party should be
"urged to accept these recommendations and to inform other Contract-
ing Parties of its intention to apply and be bound by them.""8 Further,
Non-Consultative Parties should be invited to adhere to these measures
as well. Similarly, a number of considerations were affirmed as being
"pertinent to the application of Recommendation III-7" [regarding ac-
ceptance of approved recommendations] at the IVth ATCM in 1966:
1. In becoming parties to the Antarctic Treaty, States bind
themselves to carry out the Treaty's purposes and princi-
ples;
2. Recommendations that become effective in accordance with
Article IX of the Treaty are "measures in furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Treaty;"
3. Approved recommendations are an essential part of the
overall structure of co-operation established by the Treaty;
4. In pursuance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty
there should be uniformity of practice in the activity of all
parties active in Antarctica; and
5. Approved recommendations are to be viewed in light of the
obligations assumed by Contracting Parties under the Treaty
and in particular Article X.' 9
18. Recommendation 111-7: Acceptance of approved recommendations (1964), reprinted
in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 285.
19. Explanatory Statement concerning Recommendation 111-7, reprinted in ANTARCTIC
TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 285. In full, Article X of the Antarctic Treaty provides:
"Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica
contrary to the principles or purposes of the present Treaty." Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1,
art. X.
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To the extent that recommendations further the purposes and principles
and objectives of the Treaty, they enhance the legal mandate in Article
X.
Previous recommendations do not necessarily apply to newly ad-
mitted ATCPs or to Non-Consultative Parties. The record reveals that
efforts were made to relate past recommendations to new-found obliga-
tions of incoming ATCPs, albeit not as formal requirements for ATCP
membership. In 1966, newly admitted Consultative Parties were invited
by Recommendation 111-7 to "consider accepting" recommendations
that already existed.0 Nonetheless, no evidence suggests that any State
which has been a candidate for Consultative Party status has been com-
pelled or cajoled into accepting the previous body of recommendations
as a precondition for ATCP membership.2
The Antarctic Treaty has never formally been amended since its en-
try into force in 1961. Rather, that instrument's legal reach has been
expanded through the process of adopting and approving recommended
measures. Recommended measures approved by ATCP governments in
effect become Antarctic Treaty policies that are affirmed by the practice
of States party to the agreement. The support for such reasoning is bol-
stered by the rigorous double-approval procedure required to make a
recommended measure "effective." Unanimous consent at an ATCM is
first necessary to recommend a measure to the governments, after which
each government must approve that measure through its own internal
processes. Only after all ATCP governments complete this second, na-
tional approval process does the measure become obligatory. That this
adoption/approval process has occurred on more than two hundred occa-
sions signals the willingness of the ATCP governments to submit to
these recommended measures. It seems disingenuous that the obligation
should be any less for new parties who wish to participate in the treaty
relationship and to contribute to the international legal arrangement that
is the Antarctic Treaty regime."
It appears, then, that recommendations, once approved unanimously
by the ATCPs, are intended by those governments to have certain quali-
ties of obligation. A different question hinges on whether all Antarctic
Treaty recommendations are mandatorily binding, or whether some are
only hortatory or declarative of existing principles of Antarctic Treaty
law. Those in favor of mandatory binding argue that recommendations
20. Recommendation 111-7, supra note 18.
21. Since 1977, when Poland joined as the first new member of the Consultative Party
group, the practice has been for governments applying ATCP status to give assurances that
they would approve and comply with measures previously adopted as recommendations. See
WAIrS, supra note 14, at 32.
22. See id. at 30-31.
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possess the same legally binding quality simply by virtue of being con-
sidered, processed and adopted as an ATCP recommendation under
Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty. Opponents argue that each recom-
mendation stands on its own as a separate instrument whose legal status
must be weighed according to the content of the measure.
Given the wide-ranging nature of ATCM recommended measures, a
prudent approach to determining legal status is to appraise each individ-
ual measure on its own terms and stated intent. Hence, where a measure
is drafted in terms that are unmistakably hortatory, approval by all the
respective ATCP governments would not endow it with any higher legal
status. Its "effectiveness" on obtaining approval from all governments
concerned will remain that of an exhortation. That measure simply re-
mains an urgent appeal for action.
23
On the other hand, when a measure is composed in language that
clearly aims to convey legal obligations-and that measure receives the
necessary approvals and "becomes effective"-the effect of that ap-
proval is to activate the legal obligations explicitly contained in that
measure.24 It is thus both the content of the measure and its successful
approval by all ATCP governments that confer legally-binding status on
the measure's effects." For example, the use of specific terms in phras-
ing various recommendations also implies a certain binding quality. For
example, in the preamble of Recommendation II-II, the ATCPs affirm
their conviction that "the general rules attached to that Recommendation
[I-VIII] should be scrupulously observed.2 6 In Recommendation VII-2
(Review of Specially Protected Areas), the ATCPs observe:
"Recommendation VI-8 has notably increased the protection afforded to
Specially Protected Areas by prohibiting entry into them except in ac-
cordance with a permit... ."" The insertion of prohibitions by the
ATCPs suggests the function of a legal obligation.
After being adopted unanimously by an ATCM, a recommended
measure appears to enjoy a status analogous to that of an international
agreement following signature by governments, but before ratification.
It is "in limbo," in that governments are not legally bound to the duties
23. See id. at 25.
24. See id.
25. A government that is entitled to be represented at an ATCM, but which in fact did
not attend when some measure was adopted, must nonetheless give its approval to that meas-
ure for it to "become effective" under the requirements of Article IX. Approval of measures
is necessary from all ATCPs whose representatives are "entitled to participate in the meetings
held to consider those measures:' Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX, para. 4.
26. Recommendation II-II: Conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora (1962), reprinted in
ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 2047 (emphasis added).
27. Recommendation VII-2: Review of Specially Protected Areas (1972), reprinted in
ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 2086 (emphasis added).
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in the measure, but remain obliged in spirit if not in law not to defeat the
object or purpose of the measure. Thus, there appears to be an inferred
duty not to dissuade or to cajole other governments from approving the
measure. This process resembles procedures for adopting treaty obliga-
tions. The text of an instrument is negotiated and adopted by
representatives of the attending governments. In order to convey legally
obligatory force, however, the instrument must then be subjected to ap-
proval (ratification) by each individual government, through the its own
municipal processes. A critical distinction, however, is that in the case
of Antarctic Treaty recommendations, unanimous consent by all ATCPs
is required, a stipulation rarely imposed for other international treaty
agreements outside the Antarctic Treaty System.
The temptation may arise to accord each recommendation with in-
dividual, separate treaty status.a While the 1964 Agreed Measures on
the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora clearly possesses the
requisite earmarks to qualify as a treaty, it is difficult to accept that
status for recommendations in general, or other recommendations in
particular. Treaties are legally binding in their international operation.
Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines
a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between states in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation." The essence of this notion is that the instrument
was intended by the parties to create international legal rights and obli-
gations. Recommendations, though, might not have been formally
intended to create international legal rights and obligations; therefore,
they are not treaties. At no place in their evolutionary process are they
subjected to the same municipal legal processes required to make a
treaty agreement accepted as part of domestic law. Recommended
measures entail agreements concluded by the executive branch, without
being ratified by the legislative branch of government. This fact still
does not preclude the possibility that they may reflect rules of interna-
tional law or contribute to the development of such rules, other than by
the operation of treaty law.
Acts adopted and approved as recommended measures under the
Antarctic Treaty also do not enjoy the same legal status as acts adopted
by international organizations. 9 The argument could be made that both
types of decisions are anticipated, authorized, and regulated by treaty,
and that, moreover, both share a common terminology. For instance, the
28. See 1 ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTER-STATE AND
NATIONAL DOCUMENTS 97 (W. M. Bush ed., 1982) [hereinafter Bush 1982].
29. See Bush 1982, supra note 27, at 97-98; Colella, supra note 17, at 210-11.
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terms "recommendation," "resolution," "decision," and "measure" are
normal references to acts adopted by international organizations. Even
so, the Antarctic Treaty does not establish an international organization.
There is no institutional structure with decision-making powers, no
charter or constitution with competence to issue acts, no autonomous.
organs with specific powers, no headquarters, and no secretariat. The
Antarctic Treaty does not anticipate the establishment of such an or-
ganization. Nor does it anticipate any body having the power to declare
binding acts unlawful even against the unanimous opinion of the
ATCPs. This means that the ATCPs are left to agree amongst themselves
that certain acts are permissible or impermissible, depending upon
agreement by consensus.30
One difficulty in determining which recommended measures are
fully effective is the erratic pattern of the ATCPs' depositing notification
of their approval with the depository state (the United States). As indi-
cated in Appendix A, several governments have been neither punctual
nor consistent in performing this responsibility.31 As a result, no recom-
mendation adopted after 1987 has been able to become "effective" in
accordance with Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty.32 Nonetheless,
ATCPs have voluntarily agreed to apply recommendations they have
30. Recently, the ATCPs themselves have begun to clarify the murky status of ATCM
recommendations under international law. In May 1995, at the XIXth ATCM in Seoul, an
important decision (Decision 1) was adopted to reorder more rationally acts approved under
Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty. This decision provides for establishing three categories of
acts to replace the catch-all collection of "recommendations" adopted up to that time: (1)
"measures," which contain "legally binding" provisions once approved by ATCP govern-
ments; (2) "decisions," which concern "internal organizational matters" and "will become
operative at adoption or at such other time as may be specified;" and (3) "resolutions," which
furnish only a "hortatory" test. In this sense, "measures" are considered as tantamount to the
earlier notion of "recommendations;" "resolutions" are viewed as more suggestive in nature;
and "decisions" are acts not anticipated by the Treaty since they acquire binding force im-
mediately upon adoption, or at a subsequent specified time, without unanimous ATCP
approval being required as per Article IX, paragraph 4. The rationale for giving immediate
effect to "decisions" is quite understandable: for organizational or administrative matters, it
is hardly reasonable to wait for an indefinite period, until all ATCP governments approve a
decision that has already been unanimously approved by those same governments' represen-
tatives at a Consultative Meeting. See Explanatory Note in Draft Final Report of XIX ATCM,
Doc. ATCM/WP 35, May 19, 1995, 82-83, paras. 14-16; infra text accompanying notes 60-
66.
31. The following ATCP governments, and the ATCM year of nonsubmission, have
been delinquent in submitting notifications to the Depository State: India (all since 1983);
Italy (for 1987, 1989, 1991, 1992, and 1996); Peru (all since 1989); Japan (in 1989, 1991,
1992 and 1995); Russia (all since 1989); Chile (all since 1992); Argentina and China (all
since 1992); and Korea (for the 1989 ATCM). Since 1994, Australia, New Zealand, and Uru-
guay have not deposited any approvals, nor did Norway for 1994 or 1995. Of the twenty-six
ATCPs, only Finland and Korea have deposited notifications for the 1995 and 1996 ATCMs;
only Norway has deposited its notification for the 1996 ATCM. See infra App. A.
32. See infra App. A.
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approved as binding on their conduct, pending the full deposit of ap-
proved recommended measures with the United States.
When the ATCPs adopt clearly binding acts under Article IX of the
Antarctic Treaty, these acts appear to extend or adjust the Treaty. They
can expand or contract the regulatory scope of the Treaty; they can clar-
ify or modify legal obligations; they can even alter the rights and duties
of state parties.33 Such acts constitute actual agreements independent of
Antarctic Treaty provisions and would presumably prevail over the
Treaty since they were adopted subsequent to it. These acts are legally
sustained by the unanimous will exercised by the ATCPs to approve.
such an act, demonstrated twice by their own vote.
Promulgating ATCM recommendations as "soft" law provides a
midway stage in the law-creating process. Recommendations are not
law in the sense of the legal sources enumerated in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.' As forms of soft law,
however, ATCM recommendations convey certain normative obligations
33. See, e.g., Recommendation Ill-VIII: Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Ant-
arctic Fauna and Flora (1964), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at
2048; Recommendation VII-4: Effects of tourists and non-governmental expeditions in the
Antarctic Treaty Area (1970), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at
2289; Recommendation VIII-13: The Antarctic environment (1975), reprinted in ANTARCTIC
TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 2003; Recommendation IX-5: Man's impact on the
Antarctic environment (1977), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at
2004; Recommendation X-4: Man's impact on the Antarctic environment: collection of geo-
logical specimens (1979), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 141;
Recommendation X-5: Man's impact on the Antarctic environment: Sites of Special Scien-
tific Interest: interim guidelines (1979), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra
note 2, at 2090; Recommendation X-6: Man's impact on the Antarctic environment: Sites of
Special Scientific Interest (1979), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note
2, at 2090; Recommendation XIV-2: Man's impact on the Antarctic environment: environ-
mental impact assessment (1987), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note
2, at 2036.
34. In full, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides the
following as "sources" of international law that can be used before the Court:
1. The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, estab-
lishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case
ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38. All Member States are auto-
matically parties to the Statute, as provided for in Article 94 of the U.N. Charter.
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upon all Antarctic Treaty governments. As soft law, Antarctic Treaty
recommendations carry a certain measure of legal authority.
Consultative Parties hold strong expectations that norms contained in
adopted recommendations will command respect by all ATCP
governments, as well as by other Antarctic Treaty Parties, and that these
norms will be adhered to over the long term.
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
Soft law furnishes a form of international policy coordination that is
not automatically legally binding. Soft law generally escapes the pro-
tracted ratification process to which treaties are subject, and agreement
on soft law is usually obtained more readily than in the case of treaty
law or other formally binding international obligations. In the context of
the Antarctic Treaty, resort to recommended measures as soft law allows
for greater flexibility. ATCP governments are often more willing to be
innovative when the product is not explicitly legally binding. Govern-
ments can refine and experiment with new notions or in a non-binding
situation, thus providing immediate benefits while laying the structural
foundation for negotiating binding requirements at a later time. Indeed,
this was the impetus in the 1960s and 1970s for founding the wide-
ranging, international legal obligations to conserve living and nonliving
resources and to protect the environment in the Antarctic that evolved
into the 1991 Antarctic Environmental Protection Protocol.
Governments retain ultimate control over the level of commitment
attached to a recommendation. Not all recommendations necessarily
become normative or legally binding; not all of them are intended to do
so. Some ATCP recommendations have been more procedural rather
than legally substantive. Examples include measures that call for sched-
16 37uling the next ATCM,35 or facilitating postal,36 telecommunication, or
35. See, e.g., Recommendation I-XVI: Preparations for consultative meetings (1961),
reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 22.
36. See, e.g., Recommendation I-XII: Postal services (1961), reprinted in ANTARCTIC
TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 145; Recommendation XV-22: Antarctic Treaty thirti-
eth anniversary commemorative stamp (1989), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK,
supra note 2, at 146.
37. See, e.g., Recommendation I-XI: Telecommunications (1961), reprinted in ANT-
ARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 97; Recommendation III-V: Telecommunica-
tions (1964), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 97;
Recommendation IV-26: Telecommunications (1966), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 98; Recommendation VI-1: Antarctic telecommunications
(1970), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 99; VII-7: Antarctic
telecommunications (1972), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at
103; Recommendation IX-3: Improvement of telecommunications in the Antarctic (1977),
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meteorological services." Still, the very fact that such an instrument has
been approved by the ATCPs would seem to foster hardening the nor-
mative content of that recommendation. Antarctic Treaty recommenda-
tions generally assume two approaches in soft law: (1) they appear as
strands in a web of explicit agreements comprising a general code of
conduct for national activities in the Antarctic; and (2) they serve as soft
principles of law to guide the behavior of ATCP governments in the re-
gion.
When processing recommended measures as part of the code to
regulate activities in the Antarctic, ATCPs may construct recommenda-
tions so as to mimic the terms of binding agreements or cooperative
practices of treaty agreements. Or, the ATCPs may strive to promote the
convergence of national standards or practices, which in turn can
facilitate subsequent treaty negotiations or remove the need for a treaty
altogether. A code-of-conduct approach for Antarctic Treaty recom-
mended measures, such as that fostered by recommendations dealing
with tourism, environmental protection, meteorology, or telecommuni-
cations, permits governments to participate in a cooperative arrange-
ment based on their ability to do so. The same approach can also
engender the participation of governments that might avoid binding
international agreements, either because of competing national interests,
or the lack of technical or fiscal means to participate. As codes for
conduct, ATCP recommendations can supply constructive, if only
temporary, mechanisms or precursors to treaty commitments, and they
aid in the evolution of customary international norms.
Soft principles can furnish a conceptual frame of reference for
future agreements and facilitate the crystallization process that gives
rise to customary law. Undergirding the body of recommended measures
is the principle of a common concern of humankind that advocates
protection of resources and the environment beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. The Antarctic Treaty in general and the recom-
mended measures in particular reflect a realization by governments that
state responsibility extends to protecting and conserving the polar
environment as a global commons. Protection and conservation are
intended not merely to enhance ATCPs' own national interests. Rather,
they preserve the general interest of the international community, for
both present and future generations. As promoted by the ATCP
reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 104; Recommendation XIV-7:
Antarctic meteorology and telecommunications (1987), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 114.
38. See, e.g., Recommendation VI-3: Antarctic meteorology (1970), reprinted in
ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 100; Recommendation XIV-7, supra note
37.
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recommended measures, the need to protect the Antarctic commons
suggests the recognition that ATCP governments are bound by rules of
common interest, and more significantly, that each ATCP government,
even if not directly affected, is legally entitled to demand compliance.
These attitudes provide additional pull for compliance by all ATCP
governments with recommendations that have been made "effective."
Recommended measures also may inculcate the precautionary prin-
ciple to fill the temporal gap in customary law for the Antarctic
commons. That is, the measures recommended, adopted and approved
by the ATCPs under Article IX serve as signals of certain problems and
activities that might adversely affect Antarctic activities. These meas-
ures are taken to address those problems or regulate those activities
before they become deleterious.
COMPLIANCE
The Antarctic Treaty provides no specific criteria by which to
measure States' compliance, nor any monitoring programs to determine
the recommendations' effectiveness. Article VII of the Treaty does,
however, provide for unannounced, on-site, inspections by any Consul-
tative Party of any of other ATCP government's station in the Treaty
area (south of 60' South Latitude).39 While originally intended as a
means to enforce demilitarization provisions in the Treaty-especially
by the Soviet Union during the Cold War-these ATCP inspections have
taken on added significance as means for encouraging adherence to en-
vironmental measures approved by the ATCPs. In this respect, at least
thirty-one inspection missions of more than 130 research stations have
been carried out since 1961, during which not a single violation of any
Treaty agreement has been formally reported. To the extent that ATCP
on-site inspections can determine, obligations in ATCM recommended
measures have been generally upheld by ATCP governments while op-
erating in the Antarctic Treaty area.4°
The ways and means of inspections under the Antarctic Treaty do
not escape criticism, however. Inspection procedures are limited, and
only ATCPs may conduct inspections. No collective inspection or inde-
39. Article VII provides that each ATCP may designate "observers" to carry out inspec-
tions. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. VII, para. 1.
40. There is, in addition, an inspection and monitoring system set up under the Conven-
tion on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, supra note 3, through which
national governments can inspect fishing vessels to ensure compliance with national laws
regulating fishery activities in the Southern Ocean. See CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, ANT-
ARCTICA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 245-48 (1992).
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pendent inspectorate is available. The Antarctic Treaty asserts that all
areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations, and equipment,
as well as all ships and aircraft that are discharging cargoes and person-
nel, are subject at all times to open inspection.' Yet, the Treaty does not
furnish any guidance on what sanctions or procedures should be fol-
lowed if an inspection should reveal violations. 2
Even absent inspections, environmental groups have detected
certain violations by ATCP nationals which other ATCP governments
have ignored. Perhaps the most egregious episode was what happened
during 1983-85 at Dumont d'Urville on Point Geologie, along the coast
in the French sector. Point Geologie is one of Antarctica's richest areas
in birds and seals, and an attractive area for scientists and
environmentalists to study. Nonetheless, in 1983 the French began
constructing an airfield there by leveling a series of' small islands
offshore and connecting them with archipelagic fill. No environmental
impact study was done prior to beginning construction, and no
alternatives to the airstrip apparently were seriously considered.43
Environmentalists reported in 1985 that dynamiting of some land
areas for the airstrip project had damaged or destroyed penguin
rookeries and killed several penguins. Therefore, although the ATCPs
knew that the French Point Geologie airstrip project was deleteriously
impacting indigenous wildlife, they took no political' or diplomatic
action to pressure the French to abandon their efforts. Nor did any
ATCP government at an ATCM introduce a resolution to condemn the
French for their breach of the 1964 Agreed Measures on the
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora. The attitude of the ATCPs
apparently was that this situation was better left to the French to handle
than to be stirred up in public controversy by other governments. French
compliance with the Agreed Measures failed, enforcement by the other
ATCPs was set aside, and maintenance of a conflict-free Antarctic
41. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. VII, para. 3.
42. See generally Pietro Guiliani, Inspections under the Antarctic Treaty, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW FOR ANTARCTICA, supra note 8, at 459. An inspection system has also been
implemented under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Re-
sources (CCAMLR), which deals with conserving resources in the circumpolar Southern
Ocean. Implemented in 1990, CCAMLR inspectors are authorized to stop vessels from Ant-
arctic Treaty party states that are fishing in the Southern Ocean, and report their findings to
their own governments, who then report to the CCAMLR's Commission. Prosecutions and
sanctions for violations are the responsibility of the flag state of the offending vessel. In-
spections are brief (less than two hours), and only involve one or two inspectors. See
JOYNER, supra note 40, at 245-48, 273-74.
43. See Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, The French Airstrip-A Breach of Ant-
arctic Treaty Rules?, ANTARCTICA BRIEFING NO. 9, July 30, 1986 [hereinafter BRIEFING No.
9].
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Treaty Consultative process was given priority over punishing violations
of international law affecting the Antarctic continent."
While enforcing compliance with recommendations is difficult, it is
inaccurate to infer that these measures are not enforceable. Recommen-
dations can become customary international law, or subsequently be
integrated into new ATCP treaty agreements. For example, the substan-
tial foundation for the Antarctic Environmental Protection Protocol was
laid by recommendations that set the stage for formal negotiations of
specific provisions.
The regulation of activities in the Antarctic through this scheme of
recommendations and measures might appear to be weak-premised
more on exhortation than legal obligation. This conclusion misses the
mark, however. Nearly all recommendations adopted at ATCMs secure
the necessary approval from ATCP governments within three years of
their adoption (which might be expected since each recommended
measure is initially approved through consensus, thereby signifying that
each government would be prepared to accept them). Most ATCP gov-
ernments, moreover, generally act in accord with recommended
measures, even before the measures receive formal approval and
"become effective" as obligations." This practice may be attributed to
good faith on behalf of the ATCPs to one another. It also suggests that
ATCPs view the recommended measures as essentially obligatory and
therefore binding even before they are formally in effect. Similarly, it is
reasonable to expect that governments will conduct interim policies that
do not defeat the object and purpose of recommendations. This duty is
similar to that in Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties."
Long delays have sometimes hindered some recommendations from
becoming effective. Delays can result from the requirement for
unanimous agreement in Article IX (4) of the Treaty, as well as from the
need for parties to implement legislation that gives effect to
recommendations, or to changed practices at various stations and
national expeditions.4'7 F.M. Auburn charges that these delays create a
44. For elaboration see Christopher C. Joyner, Protection of the Antarctic Environment:
Rethinking the Problems and Prospects, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 259, 268-270 (1986);
ANTARCTIC AND SOUTHERN OCEAN COALITION, BACKGROUND PAPER ON THE FRENCH
AIRFIELD AT POINT GEOLOGIE, ANTARCTICA 7-8 (1985); BRIEFING No. 9, supra note 43.
45. See WATTS, supra note 14, at 27. The fact, however, that the vast majority of ATCPs
have not deposited their national approvals of most ATCM measures adopted since 1987
could render this point arguable. See infra App. A.
46. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 18.
47. See DONALD R. ROTHWELL, THE POLAR REGIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 96-100 (1996).
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serious defect in a system which claims to be the legitimate decision
maker for a whole continent.4 Subsequent approval of recommendations
by the ATCPs suggests that these are not mere proposals for action but
are considered legally binding.
APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION
The processes of approval and implementation of recommended
measures must be distinguished. Governments generally approve of re-
commendations that have gone into force during their term as ATCP
members. The instrument of approval has generally been an executive
declaration addressed to the other ATCPs and deposited with the United
States, the depository country for the Antarctic Treaty.49 The depository
government must then "inform all signatory and acceding states when
any recommendation has been approved in accordance with Article
IX(4) of the Treaty by all the contracting parties."' A State then imple-
ments the recommendation within its domestic law, according to its
municipal procedures.
Interestingly, ATCP governments do not formally have to
disapprove, reject, or refuse to approve a recommendation. Following
adoption of a measure at an ATCM, a government can simply not act to
undertake the approval process, which in effect serves as an act of
nonapproval, and carries the legal ramification of preventing that
recommendation from entering into force for all the ATCPs. This
situation, of course, .is the "legislative price" paid for the Antarctic
Treaty's consensus system of adoption and subsequent approval of
ATCP recommendations.
A survey of recommendations that various governments have failed
to approve over the thirty-eight year history of the Antarctic Treaty sug-
gests some interesting findings. Appendices B and C inventory those
recommended measures adopted by each ATCM since 1961 that have
not received universal approval. Although not all ATCP governments
have deposited their decisions on recommended measures since 1992,
analysis of the available data yields insights into actions taken toward
compliance and enforcement of these recommended measures.
48. See F. M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLMCS 159-170 (1982).
49. As provided for in paragraph 4 of Recommendation I-XIV, "notifications of
approval by Governments of recommendations adopted at consultative meetings shall be
communicated through diplomatic channels to all other such Governments entitled to
participate in the consultative meetings." Recommendation I-XIV: Administrative
arrangements for consultative meetings (1961), para. 4, reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY
HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 22.
50. Id. para. 5.
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During the 1960s, seventy-four ATCM recommended measures
were adopted, mostly dealing with functional issues pertaining to the
Antarctic Treaty System, namely, scheduling meetings, exchanging in-
formation and facilitating scientific cooperation. Save for only a few
exceptions by Germany and India, all ATCPs approved all recommen-
dations. 1
During the 1970s, the fifty-three adopted recommendations focused
on exchange of information, facilitation of international scientific coop-
eration, and various issues concerning environmental protection and
conservation-especially regarding the protection and management of
specific areas in the Antarctic. During this decade, the most notable ob-
jection to a recommended measure came in the Seventeenth ATCM in
1972 from four states (Brazil, China, Germany, and Italy) against a rec-
ommendation pertaining to importation of laboratory animals and plants
taken from the Antarctic.52
Between 1964-94, the ATCP that most persistently did not approve
various ATCM recommended measures was Germany. Of the 178
recommendations adopted during that period, Germany opted not to
approve forty-five measures. Of these, twenty-four concerned area
protection and management. The Republic of Korea, with sixteen non-
approvals, ranked second. Six of its rejected recommendations concerned
area protection and management. The United States was third with
fourteen non-approvals, eight of which concerned area protection and
management.
The only recommendations that the United States has not approved
are from the Fifteenth and Sixteenth ATCMs, and cover a wide range of
issues: international scientific cooperation, the regulation of Antarctic
mineral resource activities, human impact on the environment, waste
disposal and waste management, prevention of marine pollution, area
protection and management, and environmental monitoring. Of these,
however, eight nonapprovals have come on recommendations concern-
ing area protection and management.
The 1989 meeting in Paris clearly emerges as the most contentious
ATCM as regards resultant recommendation approvals. Of the twenty-
two recommended measures adopted at the Fifteenth ATCM, only six-
Recommendations XV-12, 13, 15, 17, 20 and 21-have secured the
necessary approval from all ATCPs to "become effective" Ten of the
fourteen recommendations the United States has not approved came
from measures adopted at the Fifteenth ATCM in Paris in 1989. Simi-
51. The recommendations not approved by Germany and India dealt mainly with issues
on area protection and management and conservation of fauna and flora. See infra App. B.
52. See infra App. A.
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larly, the 1991 ATCM in Bonn also produced recommendations that met
with high negative reactions. Of the thirteen recommendations adopted
at Bonn, only six have gained unanimous approval from ATCP govern-
ments, namely Recommendations XVI-1, 2, 3, 5, 11, and 13."
India, Italy, and Spain cooperated in rejecting two specific recom-
mendations at the Tenth ATCM in 1978, one concerning the regulation
of Antarctic mineral resources activities (Recommendation X-1) and the
second regarding postal services (Recommendation X-9).
There are also single rejections of recommendations by various
States. Brazil and China, two populous developing countries, have each
approved all but one measure, that being Recommendation VI-10 on
area protection and management (done at the Sixth ATCM in 1970,
prior to either state becoming an ATCP). Argentina also has yet to ap-
prove only one adopted measure, Recommendation XVI-10, which also
concerned area protection and management. Given the well-known in-
tensity of Argentina's position toward its sovereignty claim in the
Antarctic, this record of near total acceptance is striking.
The recommended measures that have most uniformly defied ATCP
approval are those dealing with area protection and management from
the Fifteenth and Sixteenth ATCMs. Of 211 recommendations adopted
from 1961-96, at least sixty nonapprovals by ATCP governments have
come on a wide variety of measures.54 While unapproved recommenda-
tions by some governments have concerned issues as diverse as the
facilitation of scientific cooperation, postal services, conservation of
fauna and flora, waste disposal and management, marine protection, and
environmental monitoring, inter alia, more than one-third the nonap-
provals (twenty-four) have pertained to recommendations concerning
area protection and management.
The question thus arises why so many nonapprovals have occurred
for recommended measures concerning area protection and manage-
ment. While national interests and perceptions vary, the ATCPs
principally claim that Annex V of the 1991 Antarctic Environmental
Protection Protocol would supersede many of these measures, especially
53. While problems clearly existed for these governments over the substance of these
nonapproved recommendations, the political atmosphere for some ATCPs during 1989-91
was particularly tense and confrontational. This friction had erupted over the fate of the Ant-
arctic minerals accord that had been negotiated from 1981-88, and its precipitous demise
when Australia and France refused to sign or ratify the agreement, thereby causing it to be
abandoned in place of negotiating a special protocol to the Antarctic Treaty to protect the
Antarctic environment. See Christopher C. Joyner, CRAMRA: The Ugly Duckling of the Ant-
arctic Treaty System?, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 161, 161-
185 (Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Ostreng eds., 1991).
54. See Appendix B.
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given the new designations of Specially Reserved Areas and Multiple-
Use Planning Areas. This appears to be the case for Recommendations
XV-8, 10, and 11. Similarly, some governments (namely, the United
Kingdom, Germany, and the United States) were apparently concerned
about approving mandatory recommendations through domestic legisla-
tion which would subsequently be altered by provisions in the Madrid
Protocol once that instrument enters into force. This concern has been
raised with regard to the creation of new Sites for Special Scientific In-
terest (SSSIs) and Specially Protected Areas (SPAs), which have been
consolidated under the Protocol into a new designation, Antarctic Spe-
cially Protected Areas (ASPAs). The bottom line is that the management
plans addressed in Recommendations XVI-4, 6, 8, and 9 are out of date,
and were so nearly from the time of their adoption.5
Regarding domestic implementation of recommended measures, the
Antarctic Treaty gives ATCP governments virtually complete autonomy.
Each Consultative Party is free to approve or not approve recommenda-
tions adopted under Article IX of the Treaty. Some governments, for
example Finland and Korea, generally consider ATCM recommenda-
tions legally binding and hence automatically and immediately effective
in their domestic legal systems from the time that they are unanimously
approved.56 Many ATCPs-including Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Germany, New Zealand, Peru, Russia, Spain, the United States
and Uruguay--consider approved recommendations binding, but not
directly applicable until an ad hoc implementing measure has been is-
sued through specific executive procedures. Such procedures include
executive decrees, modification of existing legislation, revision of
agency regulations, and parliamentary law. Two ATCP states, France
and Japan, do not recognize the binding nature of recommendations, and
thus require that special implementing procedures be adopted to make
specific measures binding in their domestic law.57
Some specific examples illustrate the varying domestic procedures
for implementing ATCM recommendations. In the case of the United
States, recommended measures are generally treated as executive
agreements, though in some circumstances (e.g., the 1964 Agreed
Measures) they have been transmitted to the Senate for advice and con-
sent to ratification. The United States considers recommended measures
legally binding after they are adopted by all ATCPs at an ATCM, upon
55. See Letter from Dr. M.G. Richardson, Head, Polar Regions Section, South Atlantic
and Antarctic Department, British Foreign & Commonwealth Office, to author (Sept. 12,
1997) (on file with the author).
56. See Colella, supra note 17, at 218.
57. See Focarelli, supra note 8, at 572-73 n.531.
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which time notice of approval is communicated to the Depositary. No-
tice that a measure has been implemented in U.S. law is reported in the
Federal Register." For Australia, measures adopted by the ATCPs "are
regarded by the Australian Government as binding once necessary
changes to domestic legislation have been carried out."' 9 That is, for an
approved recommended measure to become legally binding on an Aus-
tralian citizen, a law needs to be passed before Australia can ratify the
agreement. Australian citizens are notified by the publication of such
legislation, or the government may issue an official press release or spe-
cial guidelines. 60
For the United Kingdom, the outcome of each ATCM is published
in a Government Command Paper that sets out recommendations
adopted by ATCPs. Subsequent approval of mandatory measures is
demonstrated by passing primary legislation, e.g., The Antarctic Treaty
Act of 1964, which implemented the Agreed Measures (Recommenda-
tion III-VIII), or secondary legislation (Orders in Council), which has
been used to make effective designations of Specially Protected Areas.
6'
The variable legal effects of ATCM recommendations in different
countries has led to some confusion. To remedy this, an informal meet-
ing was held in Ushuaia, Argentina in March 1995. Discussions focused
on the issue of "Recommendations" under Article IX and led to the
United Kingdom being tasked with drafting a paper for ATCM XIX (in
Seoul 1995) concerning revision of decisionmaking in the ATCM.62
During the spring of 1995, a jointly authored paper was produced by the
United Kingdom, Belgium, Chile, France, and Germany. This paper be-
came the focus of discussion at Seoul, and resulted in the decision by
58. See Letter from Harlan K. Cohen, Office of Oceans Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, to author (Sept. 24, 1997) (on file with the author).
59. Letter from Timothy Kane, Antarctic Desk Officer, Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, Government of Australia, to author (Aug. 21, 1997) (on file with the author).
60. See id.
61. See Letter from Dr. M.G. Richardson, Head, Polar Regions Section, South Atlantic
and Antarctic Department, British Foreign & Commonwealth Office, to author (Aug. 12,
1997) (on file with the author). The British government uses three procedures to implement
approved measures. For non-mandatory recommendations, "administrative or executive ac-
tion" is taken. For mandatory recommendations, domestic legislation must be introduced
before formal approval can be given. In some instances, e.g. the designation of Specially
Protected areas, secondary legislation (Orders in Council) has been used. Since entry into
force of the Antarctic Act of 1994, which implements the 1991 Antarctic Environmental
Protection Protocol, those protected area management plans adopted by the ATCPs in the
Protocol's Annex V were incorporated into Schedule 1 of the Antarctic Regulations (1995),
thus giving legal effect to these protected areas in British law. Finally, a few mandatory rec-
ommendations have been addressed through primary legislation. The outstanding example of
this situation is the Antarctic Treaty Act of 1964, which integrated the 1964 Agreed Meas-
ures into British law. Id.
62. Id. (referring to Working Paper 1 (XIX ATCM/WP1)).
Winter 1998]
Michigan Journal of International Law
the ATCPs to shift from past practice of adopting "Recommendations"
as Measures under Article IX of the Treaty to decisionmaking through
"Measures," "Decisions," or "Resolutions. 63
The status of ATCM recommendations was formally changed in
1995. Measures are intended to be legally binding once they have been
approved by all ATCPs and are to be expressed as adopted in conformity
with Article IX(4) of the Antarctic Treaty. Decisions relate to internal
organizational matters, and become operative immediately following the
ATCM at which they are adopted. Resolutions contain hortatory texts
adopted at an ATCM, but are not explicitly binding on states. These
categories do much to clarify the legal nature and obligatory status of
recommended measures under contemporary Antarctic Treaty law.
6
4
The main intent behind Decision 1, which effected this change in
ATCM decisionmaking, "was to introduce greater selectivity over which
decisions of the Treaty parties should [be] require[d] to undergo the Ar-
ticle IX procedures." 65 The aim was to eliminate disadvantages of the
previous practice, in particular: (1) to minimize the considerable delay
between the adoption of recommendations and when they became ef-
fective; and (2) to lessen the prospect that "innocuous" recommenda-
tions (e.g., those mandating that SCAR undertake some task before the
next ATCM) would not be needlessly subjected to the governmental ap-
proval process. But, the ultimate test determining whether this new
categorization clarifies and enhances legal effects will lie in how the
ATCPs treat the new forms of recommendations once they have been
adopted, and whether making legal obligation to comply with
"measures" explicit will in any way impair drafting and adoption of new
recommendations.
THE BALANCE SHEET
The Antarctic Treaty establishes a regime system governed through
a series of interconnected, legally binding international agreements
among the ATCPs. Recommended measures contribute to the Antarctic
regime system as policy links among the ATCP governments them-
selves, as well as between the various treaties. A review of the language
of the Antarctic Treaty and of many recommendations, and of state
practice, suggests that "decisions taken unanimously or by consensus by
the Consultative parties ... may amount to an agreement binding in in-
63. Id.
64. Final Report of the Nineteenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting at 19, paras.
69-70 (Seoul, May 8-19, 1995).
65. Letter from Dr. M.G. Richardson, supra note 61.
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ternational law," hence imparting to recommended measures a certain
obligatory status.
ATCM recommendations provide norm-setting, norm-applying and
norm-monitoring opportunities for governments in the polar South.
While formal international agreements usually harden and codify nor-
mative guidelines for governments and their nationals in the Antarctic,
the evolutionary process toward that end is furthered by the cumulative
effects of measures recommended, adopted and approved by ATCP gov-
ernments. As soft law, ATCP recommendations provide the main means
for articulating and making effective international norms intended to
regulate activities and the conduct of governments and persons in the
Antarctic.
In the interim before their unanimous approval by ATCP govern-
ments, measures adopted at ATCMs may be considered forms of soft
law. After approval is secured from all ATCP governments, however, the
status of a measure can be viewed as hardening. When adopted meas-
ures are approved unanimously, their status is transformed to that of an
internationally agreed-upon policy, with which ATCP governments are
obliged to comply. The degree to which this legal metamorphosis occurs
depends mainly on the content of the recommended measure, and
whether its provisions mandate actions that can be construed as binding
commitments. This process hardens soft law for the Antarctic into more
formal international legal obligations.
Although as soft law ATCM recommendations may not be binding
per se, they can indicate the likely direction in which formally binding
legal obligations will develop. They also contribute to international en-
vironmental law by establishing informal norms of behavior, and by
reflecting and possibly even codifying rules of customary international
law.
CONCLUSION
Questions persist over the legal nature and effect of recommenda-
tions adopted at Consultative Party Meetings, but international legal
scholars generally agree that they assume a quasi-legislative character.
Article IX requires that measures be formulated, adopted and recom-
mended to governments, and their repeated consent to the measures
suggests that the recommendations are more than merely exhortations.
Yet, concern over the perceived status of recommendations as legal in-
66. Explanatory Note concerning Measures Adopted under Article IX of the Antarctic
Treaty, supra note 30, para. 16.
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struments has fostered the tendency among ATCPs to rely less on hor-
tatory and more on legally-binding measures. This reliance has become
especially apparent as environmental protection and resource conserva-
tion have acquired greater prominence as ATCP policy objectives.67 It is
also apparent in the Decision made at the 1995 ATCM in Seoul.6
ATCM recommendations are not equivalent to international treaties,
nor are they intended to constitute formal amendments to the Antarctic
Treaty. Instead, recommendations are unique international instruments
designed to foster cooperation on specific issues affecting activities of
ATCP governments in the Antarctic. Recommended measures enunciate
norms still in the process of becoming distilled into binding legal prin-
ciples. By taking the form of soft law, resort to recommended measures
permits the ATCPs to address serious problems collectively, while re-
fusing to hamstring their ability to act. This flexibility has been
especially significant in recommendations pertaining to environmental
matters, when scientific evidence is wanting or inconclusive, but pre-
cautionary measures are still deemed necessary.
By treating recommendations as soft law, the ATCPs retain the ad-
vantage of allowing their governments to assume obligations that they
might not be able to assume otherwise. As soft law, many recommenda-
tions embody norms that have been distilled and harmonized by the
ATCPs so that they can be promulgated as common aims and standards.
As soft law, the obligations contained in recommendations can be for-
mulated in a more precise, distinct, and restrictive manner that is tighter
than a formally binding international agreement. These recommenda-
tions are not susceptible to formal municipal approval by ratification, as
international treaty agreements are.
That ATCPs have adopted and implemented recommended meas-
ures is significant for two fundamental reasons. First, the principles
contained in these recommendations provide ingredients for interna-
tional cooperation throughout the Antarctic Treaty System. Second, they
have been accepted and implemented as agreed-upon measures, which
contributes to their evolution from non-binding, so-called "soft" law
67. For example, in Recommendation XV-1: Comprehensive measures for the protection
of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems (1989), para.
3(b)(iii), reprinted in ANTARCTIC TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 2005, 2007, the re-
quirements for a more comprehensive environmental protection system include the need to
"consider the nature of legal obligations contained in existing measures and the need, as
necessary, to state those obligations with greater precision." Paragraph 3(c) underscores this
point as it calls for the need to consider "the form or forms of the legal or other measures
needed to ensure the maintenance, integration, consistency, and comprehensiveness of the
system for protecting the Antarctic environment. Id. para. 3(c).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
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into customary law or hard legal principles. In this way, too, recom-
mended measures provide guidelines for treatymaking and chart a more
direct course for international cooperation in the Antarctic.
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APPENDIX A:
APPROVAL, AS NOTIFIED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, OF MEASURES RELATING TO THE FURTHERANCE OF THE
PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY*
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil (1983)'
Chile
China (1985)'
Ecuador (1990)'
Finland (1989) t
France
Germany (1981)t
India (1983)t
Italy (1 987)t
Japan
Korea, Rep. (1989)
Netherlands (1990)t
New Zealand
Norway
Peru (1989)'
Poland (1977) t
Russia
South Africa
Spain (1988) t
Sweden (1988) t
U.K.
Uruguay (1985)t
U.S.A.
16 Recommendations
adopted at
First Meeting
(Canberra 1961)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
10 Recomendations
adopted at
Second Meeting
(Buenos Aires 1962)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
'ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL-
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
11 Recommendations
adopted at
Third Meeting
(Brussels 1964)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
* ALL (except 8)
ALL (except 8***)
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
* IV-6, IV-10, IV-12, and V-5 terminated by VIII-2
*** Accepted as Interim guideline
t Year attained Consultative Status. Acceptance by that State required to bring into force Recom-
mendations or Measures of meetings from that year forward.
t Office of Ocean Affairs, United States Department of State.
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil (1983)'
Chile
China (1985) t
Ecuador (1990) t
Finland (1989)'
France
Germany (1981)
India (1983)'
Italy (1987) t
Japan
Korea, Rep. (1989)
Netherlands (1990) t
New Zealand
Norway
Peru (1989) t
Poland (1977) t
Russia
South Africa
Spain (1988)t
Sweden (1988) t
U.K.
Uruguay (1985)'
U.S.A.
28 Recommendations
adopted at
Fourth Meeting
(Santiago 1966)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL (except 1-11 and
13-19)
ALL (except 18)
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
9 Recommendations
adopted at
Fifth Meeting
(Paris 1968)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL (except 5* and 6)
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
15 Recommendations
adopted at
Sixth Meeting
(Tokyo 1970)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL (except 9 and 10)
ALL (except 9 and 10)
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
* IV-6, IV-10, IV-12, and V-5 terminated by VIII-2
** Accepted as Interim guideline
t Year attained Consultative Status. Acceptance by that State required to bring into force Recom-
mendations or Measures of meetings from that year forward.
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)
9 Recommendations
adopted at
Seventh Meeting
(Wellington 1972)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL (except 5)
ALL
ALL (except 5)
14 Recommendations
adopted at
Eighth Meeting
(Oslo 1975)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
6 Recommendations
adopted at
Ninth Meeting
(London 1977)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
Ecuador (1990) t
Finland (1989)'
France ALL ALL ALL
Germany (1981) t  ALL (except 5) ALL (except 1, 2, ALL
and 5)
India (1983)' ALL ALL ALL
Italy (1987) t  ALL (except 5) ALL ALL
Japan ALL ALL ALL
Korea, Rep. (1989) ALL ALL ALL
Netherlands (1990) t
New Zealand ALL ALL ALL
Norway ALL ALL ALL
Peru (1989) t  ALL ALL ALL
Poland (1977)t  ALL ALL ALL
Russia ALL ALL ALL
South Africa ALL ALL ALL
Spain (1988) t ALL ALL ALL
len (1988) t
ALL ALL ALL
* IV-6, IV-10, IV-12, and V-5 terminated by VIII-2
*** Accepted as Interim guideline
t Year attained Consultative Status. Acceptance by that State required to bring into force Recom-
mendations or Measures of meetings from that year forward.
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil (1983)'
Chile
China (1985)t
Swed
U.K.
Uruguay (1985) t
U.S.A.
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)
9 Recommendations
adopted at
Tenth Meeting
(Washington 1979)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
3 Recommendations
adopted at
Eleventh Meeting
(Buenos Aires 1981)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
8 Recommendations
adopted at
Twelfth Meeting
(Canberra 1983)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
Ecuador (1990) t
Finland (1989) t
France ALL ALL ALL
Germany (1981)t ALL ALL ALL
India (1983)t  ALL (except 1 and 9)
Italy (1987) t  ALL (except 1 and 9)
Japan ALL ALL ALL
Korea, Rep. (1989) ALL ALL ALL
Netherlands (1990)t
New Zealand ALL ALL ALL
Norway ALL ALL ALL
Peru (1989) t  ALL ALL
Poland (1977)t  ALL ALL ALL
Russia ALL ALL ALL
South Africa ALL ALL ALL
Spain (1988) t  ALL (except 1 and 9) ALL (except 1) ALL
Sweden (1988)t
U.K. ALL ALL ALL
Uruguay (1985) t  ALL ALL ALL
U.S.A. ALL ALL ALL
SIV-6, IV-10, IV-12, and V-5 terminated by VIII-2
** Accepted as Interim guideline
t Year attained Consultative Status. Acceptance by that State required to bring into force Recom-
mendations or Measures of meetings from that year forward.
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil (1983)'
Chile
China (1985)'
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)
16 Recommendations
adopted at
Thirteenth Meeting
(Brussels 1985)
Approved
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
10 Recommendations
adopted at
Fourteenth Meeting
(Rio de Janeiro 1987)
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
ALL
22 Recommendations
adopted at
Fifteenth Meeting
(Paris 1989)
Apgroved
ALL
ALL
Ecuador (1990) t
Finland (1989) t  ALL
France ALL ALL ALL
Germany (1981) t  ALL (except 10 to 13) ALL ALL (except 3, 4, 8, 10,
11,22)
India (1983) t
Italy (1987) t
Japan ALL ALL
Korea, Rep. (1989) ALL ALL ALL (except 1-11, 16,
18,19)
Netherlands (1990) t
New Zealand ALL ALL ALL
Norway ALL ALL ALL
Peru (1989) t
Poland (1977)t  ALL ALL ALL
Russia ALL ALL
South Africa ALL ALL ALL
Spain (1988) t
Sweden (1988) t  ALL
U.K. ALL' ALL (except 2) ALL (except 3, 4, 8, 10,
11)
ALL
ALL (except 1-5,
8-11,14)
* IV-6, IV-10, IV-12, and V-5 terminated by VIII-2
*** Accepted as Interim guideline
Year attained Consultative Status. Acceptance by that State required to bring into force Recom-
mendations or Measures of meetings from that year forward.
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil (1983)'
Chile
China (1985)'
Uruguay (1985)'
U.S.A.
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)
13 Recommendations
adopted at
Sixteenth Meeting
(Bonn 1991)
Approved
ALL except XVI-10
-ALL
4 Recommendations
adopted at
Seventeenth Meeting
(Venice 1992)
Approved
1 Recommendation
adopted at
Eighteenth Meeting
(Kyoto 1994)
Approved
China (1985)' ALL
Ecuador (1990)'
Finland (1989) t  ALL ALL ALL
France ALL ALL ALL
Germany (1981)' ALL (except 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 ALL (except 2,3) ALL
& 10)
India (1983) t
Italy (1987) t
Japan ALL
Korea, Rep. (1989) ALL (except 12) ALL (except 1)
Netherlands (1990)'
New Zealand ALL ALL
Norway ALL ALL
Peru (1989)'
Poland (1977)'
Russia
South Africa ALL ALL ALL
Spain (1988) t
Sweden (1988)' ALL ALL ALL
U.K. ALL (except 4, 6, 8, 9) ALL ALL
Uruguay (1985)' ALL ALL
U.S.A. ALL (except 4, 8, 9, 10) ALL ALL
*IV-6, IV-10, IV-12, and V-5 terminated by VIII-2
*** Accepted as Interim guideline
t Year attained Consultative Status. Acceptance by that State required to bring into force Recom-
mendations or Measures of meetings from that year forward.
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil (1983)'
Chile
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)
5 Measures
adopted at
Nineteenh Meeting
(Seou1995)Approved
2 Measures
adopted at
Twentieth Meeting
(Utrecht 1996)
Aooroved
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil (1983)'
Chile
China (1985)1
Ecuador (1990)'
Finland (1989)'
France
Germany (1981)'
India (1983 )t
ALL
Italy (1987)
Japan
Korea, Rep. (1989) ALL
Netherlands (1990)t
New Zealand
Norway ALL
Peru (1989) t
Poland (1977)t
Russia
South Africa
Spain (1988)'
Sweden (1988)'
U.K.
Uruguay (1985)t
U.S.A.
* IV-6, IV-10, IV-12, and V-5 terminated by VIII-2
*** Accepted as Interim guideline
'Year attained Consultative Status. Acceptance by that State required to bring into force Recom-
mendations or Measures of meetings from that year forward.
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APPENDIX B:
ATCP RECOMMENDED MEASURES ACCORDING TO
AREAS OF CONCERN, 1961-1992
ATCP Recommended Measures may be divided into several princi-
pal issue areas. The following taxonomy breaks down the recommended
measures by issue area. It also indicates the number of measures rec-
ommended in parentheses, and which governments have yet to approve
any specific measure. Note that, beginning with the Eighteenth Meeting,
ATCPs have been lax in reporting their adoption of recommended
measures to the depository state (the United States). Therefore, this list
only includes information on recommendations through the Seventeenth
Meeting in 1992.
OPERATION OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM: MEETINGS (7)
I-XIV III-VI IV-24
I-XVI Ill-VII X111-15aII-Ix
OPERATION OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM: INFORMATION (9)
I-IV V-3 Xlll-1a
IV XII-6, XIII-2"
I-Vill XII-8a XlV-1a
OPERATION OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM:
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (21)
I-I Il-VI VI-7
II-I VI-12
I-VI 11-11 VI-13
I-VII IV-23 VIII-6
I-ill IV-27 XIII-3"
I-XilI VI-2 XVI-I*"b
I1-1 VI-3
"I-IV
a No information is available on India's or Italy's approval of
recommendations from the 11 th Meeting onward.
No information is available on Chile's or Poland's approval of
recommendations from the 16th Meeting onward.
No information is available on Belgium's, Brazil's, Japan's, or Russia's
d approval of recommendations from the 15th Meeting onward.No information is available on Argentina's or China's approval of
recommendations from the 17th Meeting onward.
IV-6, IV-10, IV-12, and V-5 terminated by VIII-2.
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FACILITATION OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION (30)
V-2
VI-1
VI-3
VII-7
VII-8
VIII-5 (not approved by
Germany)
VIII-7
IX-3
IX-4
X-3
XIV-9 a
XIV-108
XV-1 4 (not approved by the
US)
XV.15 ac
XV-16 (not approved by Korea)a
XV-18 (not approved by Korea) c
XV-19 (not approved by Korea)ac
XV-20 =
XVI-12 (not approved by Korea)ac
XVII.4 cd
POSTAL SERVICES (4)
I-XII X-9 (not approved by India, Italy, or Spain)
V-I XV-22 (not approved by Germany)w
ACTIVITIES OF NON-CONSULTATIVE PARTIES (1)
VIII-8
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS:
Seals (5)
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (4)
VIII-10 X-2
IX-2 XI-2
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (6)
VII-61 IX-1 XI-1 (not approved by Spain)"
VIII-14 X-1 (not approved by India, Italy, XV-2 (not approved by Korea
or Spain) or US)r
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THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: PROTECTION AND CONSERVATION
Man's Impact on the Environment (6)
VI.4 VIII-1 1 IX-5
VII-1 VIII-13 XV-1 (not approved by Korea
or US)w
Environmental Impact Assessment (3)
ViII-11 XII-3a XIV-2 (not approved by United
Kingdom)"
Conservation of Fauna and Flora (9)
I-VIII
Ill-ViII (not approved by
Germany or India)
III-x
IV-18 (not approved by
Germany or India)
IV-19 (not approved by
Germany)
IV-20
VI-9 (not approved by
Germany or India)
Waste Disposal and Waste Management (4)
VIII-11 XIII4a
XII-48 XV-3 (not approved by Germanj Korea, UnitedKingdom, or US)
THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT:
PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION (1)
XV-4 (not approved by Germany, Korea, United Kingdom, or US)w
THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT:
AREA PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT (55)
I-IX
IV-1 (not approved by Germany)
IV-1 0 (not approved by
Germany)*
IV-12e
IV-15 (not approved by
Germany)
X-6
XI-3a
XII.5a
Xli-7a
X111-5a
XIII-7'
XV-7 (not approved by Korea)8
XV-8 (not approved by GermanK
Korea, United Kingdom, or US)
XV-9 (not approved by Korea)=
XV-1 0 (not approved by
Germany, Korea, United
Kingdom, or US)=
XV-1 1 (not approved by
Germany, Korea, United
Kingdom, or US)w
XV-12 =
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THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT:
AREA PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT (CONTINUED)
V-5 (not approved by Germany)'
VI-8
VI-10 (not approved by
Brazil,China, Germany or India)
VI-14
VII-2
VII-3
VII-9
VIII-1 (not approved by
Germany)
VIII-2 (not approved by
Germany)
VIII-3
VIII-4
VIII-5 (not approved by
Germany)
X-5
XIII.8'
XIII-9a
XIII-10 (not approved by
Germany)a
XII1-11 (not approved by
Germany)a
XIII-12 (not approved by
Germany)a
XIII-13 (not approved by
Germany)'
XIII-16,
XIV-48
XIV-5"
XIV-6'
XIV-8'
XV-6 (not approved by Korea)a
XV-13c
XVI-2'a
XVI-3 '"
XVI-4 (not approved by
Germany, United Kingdom,
or US)'b
XVI.5'a
XVI-6 (not approved by
Germany, United Kingdom,
or US)wx
XVI-7 (not approved by
Germany) =b
XVI-8 (not approved by
Germany, United Kingdom,
or US)'b
XVI-9 (not approved by
Germany)'b
XVI-1 0 (not approved by
Argentina, Germany,
United States)wx
XVI.11 ac
XVII-3 (not approved by
Germany)b
THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT:
Environmental Monitoring (2)
XV-5 (not approved by Korea or US)a XVII-1 (not approved by Korea)- '
Siting of Antarctic Scientific Stations (2)
XV-17f
Oil Contamination (2)
Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (1)
VIII-12
XIII-6a
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Use of Radio Isotopes (2)
VI-5 VI-6
Scientific Drilling (1)
XIV-30
Use of Antarctic Ice (1)
XV.21a
New Islands (1)
VI-11
Tourism and Non-Governmental Activities (7)
IV-27 VIII-9 XI-3'
VI-7 X-8 XVI-13"
VI-4
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APPENDIX C
ROSTER OF STATES WHO HAVE NOT APPROVED VARIOUS
ATCP RECOMMENDATIONS
GERMANY
Facilitation of International Scientific Cooperation
VII-5
Postal Services
XV-22
Conservation of Fauna and Flora
III-Vill IV-1E
IV-18 VI-9
Waste Disposal and Waste Management
XV-3
Prevention of Marine Pollution
XV-4
Area Protection and Management
VIII-5
XIII-10
XIII-1
XIII-12
XIII-13
XV-8
XV-10
UNITED STATES
XV-11
XVI-4
XVI-6
XVI-7
XVI-8
XVi-lO
XVII-3
Facilitation of International Scientific Cooperation
XV-14
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
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XV-8
XV-9
XV-10
Recommended Measures Under the Antarctic Treaty
Man's Impact on the Environment
XV-1
Waste Disposal and Waste Management
xv-3
Prevention of Marine Pollution
XV.4
Area Protection and Management
XV-11
XVI-4
XVI-6
XVI-8
XVI-10
Environmental Monitoring
XV-5
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Facilitation of International Scientific Cooperation
XV-16 XV-19
XV-18 XVI-12
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
XV-2
Man's Impact on the Environment
XV.1
Waste Disposal and Waste Management
XV-3
Michigan Journal of International Law
Prevention of Marine Pollution
XV-4
Area Management and Protection
XV-8
XV-9
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XV-10XV-1 1
Environmental Monitoring
XVII-1
UNITED KINGDOM
Environmental Impact Assessment
XIV-2
Waste Disposal and Waste Management
XV-3
Prevention of Marine Pollution
XV-4
Area Protection and Management
XV-1 1
XVI-4
XVI-6
XVI-8
INDIA
Postal Services
X-9
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
X-1
XV-8
XV-10
Recommended Measures Under the Antarctic Treaty
Conservation of Fauna and Flora
III-VIII
IV-18
VI-9
VI-IO
ITALY
Postal Services
X-9
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
X-1
SPAIN
Postal Services
x-9
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
X-1 XI-1
BRAZIL AND CHINA
Area Protection and Management
VI-lO
ARGENTINA
Area Protection and Management
XVI-10
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